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Abstract 
 
 
This article examines recent attempts by IR scholars to flesh out a reflexive approach 
inspired by the work of Pierre Bourdieu. The French sociologist pioneered the idea of turning 
the tools of sociology onto oneself in order to apply the same grid of social analysis to the 
object and subject of scholarship. This represents the culmination of a long tradition of 
seeking to understand from where one speaks and grasp our subjective biases through 
reflexive means. But as I argue Bourdieu – like most reflexive scholars – largely 
overestimated his ability to grasp his own subject position. For he assumed he could be 
objective about the very thing he had the least reasons to be objective about: himself. 
Instead of bending over backwards in this way and directly take the subject into account, I 
then propose to rearticulate the problematic of reflexivity by going back to a more classic 
concern with the question of alienation. Through a detailed critique of Bourdieu's reflexive 
approach and the ways in which it was received in IR, I set out a series of principles to 
reconfigure the agenda of reflexivity and offer a platform for a proper methodological 
alternative to positivism.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The reflexive approach in IR was largely developed during the post positivist debate 
of the 1980s and 1990s. Scholars locating themselves within this approach challenged 
positivism by emphasising that there is no neutral and objective ground on which to base 
theories of IR. Emphasising that facts are informed by theories and that theories are 
themselves value laden, they argued that knowledge always reflects a specific perspective 
on the world. As Robert Cox famously put it, 'theory is always for someone and for some 
purpose.2 Following on this observation, reflexive scholars insisted on the need to reflect on 
their specific social and subjective biases and make the specificity of their viewpoint 
explicit.3 If there can be no absolute foundations upon which one can build theories, they 
argued, it is necessary to identify the subjective and normative choices that guide our 
research. In this way, reflexivity came to be defined foremost as a process of bending over 
backward to take oneself into account and thus qualify our knowledge claims by specifying 
where they come from. However, as Hamati-Attaya points out, this first wave of reflexive 
scholarship never offered concrete guidance in terms of methodology. Too often, it was 
satisfied with stating an ethical commitment to self-awareness rather than turning 
reflexivity into a concrete methodology.  
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However, the project of fleshing out a reflexive agenda of research has been taken 
up by a new wave of constructivist scholarship attempting to make good on the promises of 
this approach by turning to the work of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu.4 What makes 
Bourdieu’s work intriguing is his emphasis on the challenges reflexivity poses. As he points 
out, it is not sufficient to examine oneself and disclose interests and value commitments we 
have. For reflexivity requires a methodology to excavate what is not readily transparent to 
the scholar: the deeper structures that condition and shape scholarship itself.5 For Bourdieu, 
the key is to turn the tools of sociology onto oneself, and apply the same grid of social 
analysis to the object and subject of IR scholarship. In the words of Pierre Bourdieu, one 
needs to objectify the objectifying subject in order to understand the very process by which 
world politics is constructed as an object of enquiry.  
The aim of this article is to assess whether Bourdieu's idea of objectifying the 
objectifying subject can help push the agenda of reflexivity in order to establish it as a 
proper alternative to positivism. Engaging with Bourdieu’s ideas about reflexivity is of great 
importance to IR not only because of the influential nature of his work in this field, but more 
fundamentally because Bourdieu pushed key themes latent in the first wave of reflexive 
scholarship to their logical end point. By insisting on the need to treat the subject as an 
object of research in its own right, Bourdieu essentially systematised the project of 
disclosing from where we speak.  
In this paper, I argue that this project cannot succeed. My aim is to raise more 
broadly a series of problems related to the way in which reflexivity has been conceived as a 
project to locate from where one speaks. As I argue, Bourdieu largely overestimated, as 
most reflexive scholars, his ability to grasp his own subject position. Reflexive scholars who 
follow this course often fail to explain why assumptions that bias their understanding of 
world politics would not also condition how they conceive of their own subject position. 
Essentially reflexive scholars assume they can be objective about the very thing they have 
the least reasons to be objective about: themselves. Starting from this critique, the article 
emphasises key problems in Bourdieu's project and then traces how these were reflected in 
the various ways in which his agenda was received in IR. This will lead me to argue that 
reflexivity cannot offer a productive alternative to positivism as long as it relies on this 
misleading ambition of locating the subject. I use this critique to put forward in the 
conclusion a few ideas about how to rearticulate the problematic of reflexivity along the 
lines of a more phenomenological concern with the question of alienation. 
 
 
1. Reflexivity à la Bourdieu 
 
The problematic of reflexivity has gained a new lease of life in the past few years 
with the publication of a series of important interventions which have helped bring 
reflexivity back to the fore.6 This is part of a growing interest in critical methodologies within 
IR.7 One of the defining features of this trend has been a renewed interest in the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu, a shift partly initiated by Stefano Guzzini’s critique of the drift of 
constructivism towards positivism.8 Guzzini intended to ground constructivism in a reflexive 
dimension. As he argued, a constructivist approach which emphasises ‘the constructed 
nature of ideas’ cannot be satisfied with simply projecting construction as a feature of world 
politics without deriving the logical corollary that academic knowledge itself should be 
treated as a construction. For meaning, indeed, is ‘constructed both at the level of action 
3 
 
and observation.’9 To develop this dual vantage point, encompassing both the object of 
world politics and the scientific community analysing it, Guzzini proposed to turn to 
Bourdieu's reflexive sociology precisely because of its clear program for addressing this 
challenge.  
Since this intervention, numerous scholars have seen in Bourdieu a stepping stone 
for the renewal of constructivism, one which emphasises the importance of practice.10 This 
sociological anchor, they argue, provides a platform for a rich reflexive program that goes 
beyond textual analysis. According to Frédérique Mérand and Vincent Pouliot, Bourdieu 
opens a third path to ground constructivism firmly outside of the neopositivist camp 
without falling into poststructuralist relativism.11 What makes Bourdieu’s work particularly 
intriguing is the way in which it radicalises key themes of reflexivity. Bourdieu insisted that 
the classic reflexive stance based on making explicit one’s biases is insufficient, since it risks 
missing the practices we have internalised and now take for granted. According to him, 
there is a deeper ‘scientific unconscious embedded in theories, problems, and (especially 
national) categories of scholarly judgement’ which needs to be uncovered.12 Reflexivity thus 
cannot be simply concerned with disclosure. It must provide a means towards greater rigor 
to excavate what is not readily apparent. To meet this exigency, Bourdieu proposed to turn 
the tools of sociology back onto the scholar doing the analysis. This is what he referred to as 
objectifying the objectifying subject; a commitment to analyse the evolution of an object of 
research both in its given social field and in the academic field where it is conceptualised.13  
This re-articulation of the reflexive agenda was meant to avoid the treacherous 
waters of the ‘personal’ which previously seemed the logical endpoint of reflexivity. As I 
mentioned, the first wave of IR reflexive scholars had emphasised the need for making 
explicit our normative and social commitments. But the danger with this strategy, Bourdieu 
argued, is that it encourages us to lapse back on one’s interior life. It is both narcissistic in its 
assumption that one’s personal life is of public interest, and politically dangerous for it 
opens the door to easy dismissals based on subjective grounds.14 For Bourdieu, reflexivity 
can be viable only if it conforms itself to scientific criteria of rigour and becomes itself an 
object of scientific debate.  
In pushing this agenda of reflexivity, Bourdieu had the great insight to conceive of 
reflexivity as an integral component of scientific practice, or more precisely as a means to 
control for bias in the production of knowledge, rather than see it as a concession based on 
the inevitability of bias as other reflexivist tended to believe.15 In this regard, the French 
sociologist developed a distinctive reflexive approach defined by three central tenets. The 
first is to determine one’s own trajectory and position in a social field. This is perhaps the 
aspect which comes closest to the classic notion of reflexivity, but Bourdieu proposed to 
think of these biases in sociological rather than normative terms. The point is not simply to 
reflect on one’s own biases through some form of autobiography and announce them as 
axioms of our thinking, but rather to study our trajectory according to sociological 
categories, thus privileging experiences that are amenable to social analysis (for example 
one's experiences of a specific social hierarchy or of a given social struggle). The objective is 
to generate an account that can be subject to further sociological enquiry and scientific 
debate.  
The second aspect of Bourdieu's reflexivity is the study of the academic field in which 
one operates. This aspect of his reflexive program seeks to uncover the practices and ways 
of thinking which shape how we approach and construct distinct objects of research. It must 
capture the doxa of a social field, that is the set of practices and norms which are 
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internalised and taken for granted within a given social field.16 This is not a glorified review 
of literature seeking to trace how debates about a given objects have evolved. For the 
central point that Bourdieu made is that the interests played out in academic debates 
cannot be simply read off the social field that is studied by academics. They are shaped by 
social struggles that are distinctive to academia as a social field in its own right. This is why, 
it was not sufficient in the eyes of Bourdieu to simply trace how ideas have developed in the 
literature while keeping world politics as the key referent for these academic developments. 
Instead, Bourdieu asked for a sociology of academia, a project that he himself conducted.17 
For the struggles waged at the level of ideas are not simply ones that pertain to the object 
of study itself, but also to the studying of the object.18 
Finally, the third component of Bourdieu’s approach concerns the specular 
perspective that academics often develop when analysing social objects. The problem stems 
from the position of scholars as external observers which often creates a particular 
intellectual bias as scholars overly rationalize social situations they study, and miss their 
pragmatic dimension. This is an important insight inherited from Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein which highlights that agents often internalise practices and a sense of the 
game (or a logic of practice) without rationalising or intellectualising  them. In that respect, 
one must pay attention to the illocutionary aspects of practice rather than simply rely on 
the way these practices are represented. There is a bias which comes from being an 
academic who, being an outsider, does not have direct access to the 'feel for the game' 
which actors have built through a long experience of their social field. The challenge is thus 
to avoid reifying social situations by reducing them to a set of determining rule of the game. 
Instead, Bourdieu wants to think about them in terms of concrete problems that agents 
seek to solve practically and this requires a constant reflexive monitoring of the biases that 
come from our own position as external observer.   
 These three components are the pillars of Bourdieu's reflexive agenda to objectify 
the objectivation, or objectify the objectifying subject. It sets out an attractive framework 
reappropriated by various scholars in IR because it offers a concrete strategy for developing 
reflexivity and consolidating constructivism as an alternative to positivism. Xavier Guillaume, 
for example, turns to Bourdieu in order to fulfil what he sees as a necessary condition for 
the dialogical engagement he has sought to promote in his work. According to him, ‘to 
integrate the idea of subjectivity and reflexivity precisely is to constitute a body of 
knowledge that is self-aware, through its own archaeology, of its bias and limitations’.19 
From a different perspective, Leander insists on the importance of this methodology for 
challenging the way in which our own social field shapes our choices of subjects and 
understandings.20 Through this, she argues, our 'inherent biases and blindness are made 
visible and (hence) potentially controllable. 21  Similarly, Eagleton Price wishes to use 
Bourdieu's reflexivity to objectify 'the social conditions that have formed the theorist and, in 
particular, how their relative position in the professional universe shapes their interests and 
investments’.22 Finally, Hamati-Ataya sees in Bourdieu a promising path to escape the realm 
of meta theory where reflexivity has too often been confined. She sees in the strategy of 
objectifying the objectification an approach that can yield concrete theoretical and empirical 
findings for the study of world politics.23 The injunctions frequently voiced by Bourdieu-
inspired constructivists attest to a renewed concern for problematizing one’s own gaze on 
world politics. In the following section I wish to raise various problems with this proposal 
and use this to reflect more generally on the possibility of developing a productive reflexive 
methodology as an alternative to positivism.  
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2. The End Point of Reflexivity? 
 
 Reflexivity has always been concerned with addressing the problem that subjectivity 
poses for knowledge production. If we understand subjectivity as what is distinctive of a 
subject’s experience, then it is fair to say that traditional conceptions of science have sought 
to remove this dimension through methodological means so that knowledge claims can 
stand on their own and acquire universal value.24 But reflexive scholars have long assumed 
that such an objective account is impossible. Science, they argue, cannot be based on 
absolute rules, or a methodology, which would level the terrain of knowledge. Subjective 
differences, that is differences that pertain to what characterises a given subject in relation 
to others, mean that there is always something political that is involved in science. For there 
is no absolute ground to settle differences, since we are always more implicated than we 
realise in the knowledge we produce.  
 This problem has been fully documented in the work of reflexive scholars.25 But 
being aware of these limits can only be meaningful if it makes a difference to the way we 
study world politics. And this is perhaps where reflexivity has most struggled to establish 
itself for too often it has left unclear what are the expectations it sets for itself.26 It is 
interesting, in this regard, to note how rare are the reflexive scholars who actually live up to 
the very agenda they promote. For all, their emphasis on disclosure, the first wave of 
reflexive scholars so rarely did disclose what was at stake in their studies. Even scholars who 
called for a Bourdieu inspired practice of objectifying the objectifying subject, have rarely 
come out concretely to apply this to themselves. Anna Leander candidly recognises the 
virtual absence of such accounts in the work of reflexive scholars. She explains this lack by 
pointing to the limited space in academic writing which means that in most cases 'the 
reflexive grounding of the argument will most probably have to remain unarticulated'.27 But, 
I argue that this absence should not be simply read as the product of an incomplete 
application of reflexivity. It is symptomatic of more fundamental problems with the way in 
which this agenda has been set up in the first place. In what follows, I make five 
propositions that challenge Bourdieu's framing of the reflexive problematic and use them to 
push reflexivity in more productive directions.  
 
First proposition: Objectifying the objectifying subject is an open invitation for further 
reification of the self.  
 
 It has always been a curious turn for reflexive scholars to assume that they could be 
objective about the very thing they have the least reason to be neutral about: themselves. 
In that respect, Bourdieu’s sociological reflexivity asks from the reader an incredible leap of 
faith in granting to reflexive scholars the ability that they themselves refuse to grant 
others.28  This is a wager we have no reason to endorse. For if our own biases still shape our 
self-understanding, what respite can there be in following this circular strategy of bending 
over backward? Taking oneself into account will simply replay the biases we are supposed 
to lay bare.  
The problem here is not one of intention. It concerns the incentives stacked against 
what reflexivity seeks to uncover. Indeed, there are good reasons for why our judgement 
tends to falter when thinking about the self. For there is an inevitable conflict of interest at 
the heart of this confessional strategy. Either scholars will disclose significant biases and risk 
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undermining their position or disclose meaningless assumptions which will be of little 
significance. Cast in these terms, reflexivity often boils down to a self-defeating task of 
presenting our subjective perspective in ways which do not undermine our politics. In most 
cases, this type of disclosure paints the subject in the broadest brush strokes, often relying 
on abstract principles that are difficult to tie to any concrete politics. A good example of this 
are the gratuitous commitments to emancipation which pepper the field. They illustrate 
how this reflexive duty is often fulfilled, especially by first wave reflexivists, in a meaningless 
way. For this disclosure never places these reflexive scholars in a vulnerable position. It 
speaks of politics in such vague and unassailable ways that the so called biases disclosed are 
rendered effectively apolitical in that they provide no help to understand what is at stake. 
For after all, who really is against emancipation?  
Unsurprisingly, reflexivity cast in these terms tends to produce the opposite of what 
it purports to do. It usually betrays the inner certitude of reflexive scholars that they are on 
the 'right side' and thus often becomes a privileged vehicle for self-promotion.29 Bourdieu’s 
own reflexive account constitutes a good illustration of this paradoxical outcome. It tells the 
story that conforms to the classic themes of emancipation, in which Bourdieu plays the part 
of a hard-working scholar coming from outside of the establishment who is confronted to 
the hypocrisy of an academic field rife with self-edifying intellectuals.30 Reflexivity becomes 
here a register for Bourdieu to claim an exceptional trajectory which would have led him to 
a particularly rigorous or objective world view. 
If I was able, in a way which seemed to me to be rather ‘exact’, to objectivize the 
field that I had just entered, it was undoubtedly because of the highly improbable 
social trajectory that had led me from a remote village in a remote region of 
southwestern France to what was then the apex of the French educational system 
predisposed me to a particularly sharpened and critical intuition of the intellectual 
field.31   
 
Interestingly, Bourdieu systematically avoids depicting himself in positions of power. The 
history he tells is always one of resistance to the power of others. And yet this is someone 
who occupied some of the most prestigious positions in French Academia, most notably the 
Chair of sociology at the College de France and the directorships of the Centre de Sociologie 
Européennes and the journal Actes de la recherche en sciences sociale. This is no mere lapse 
on Bourdieu's part. It reflects the limitations we confront when speaking of the self while 
seeking to avoid undermining one’s own politics. This often goes hand in hand with a 
tendency to shift away from problematizing subjective biases in order to emphasise 
conscious motivations in order to better align our politics with our analytical claims. If 
Bourdieu’s own narrative as the son of a provincial petit Bourgeois may help explain why he 
attacked existentialism and its cult of the intellectual.32 or why his anthropological work in 
Algeria led him to challenge the reification of structuralism, none of this helps us really 
grasp the subjective biases which shape Bourdieu’s own account. On the contrary, they 
work to do the opposite, effectively consolidating his worldview in the name of personal 
crusades which are crafted in such a way as to elicit sympathy.  
Even his more sociological work aimed at analysing the doxa of academic life 
reproduces these problems. In Homo Academicus, Bourdieu basically portrays the academic 
field as fractured between hard working, risk taking, but marginalised researchers and 
institutionally rooted sell outs. There is, he says, a  
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[…] sort of antinomy between science and respectability, between the deviant precarious career of 
the researcher and the more limited but safer trajectory of the profession, which can be related to 
differences objectively inherent in their institutional position, in their dependence or independence 
from the temporal powers, and also to differences in the disposition of the agents, more or less 
inclined towards or condemned to accept conformity of innovation.33 
 
Once more there is little doubt as to where Bourdieu locates himself in this portrayal. 
Whether he is right or not is not the issue here. The point is that there is not much that is 
reflexive about Homo Academicus because nothing here problematizes Bourdieu's own view 
point.  
This is not to take anything away from what Bourdieu may have accomplished. 
Indeed, my point is not that Bourdieu failed in applying his own reflexive program, but 
rather that one cannot expect him to have succeeded in the first place, whether through 
normative introspection or sociological excavations. For reflexive scholars should know 
better than to believe that they can shed their own biases when they are analysing their own 
trajectory. There is little to learn about the subject in these narratives of the self, or more 
specifically about what it is that one has at stake as a subject.  Such narratives seek to make 
sense of an experience that is often more contradictory and fragmented, they tend to 
exaggerate the coherency of the self. They always smoothen and rationalise one’s position 
(or trajectory) in such a way as to make it appear more coherent and justified than it is. This 
is part of the normal processes by which people seek to tape together their fragmented 
experience in order to make sense of their life and project themselves in the future. But as a 
result, these accounts of the self deflect attention from the real issue of subjectivity and 
conceal the very biases and contradictions that are actually at work. By definition, they point 
to conscious commitments and turn our gaze away from unconscious biases.34 
If reflexivity should be anything in terms of methodological rigour, it should rely 
precisely on the opposite strategy: a systematic refusal to indulge in narcissistic narratives 
about the self even when they are shrouded in sociological garb. If we may grant that these 
narratives have a place in academia, it is not because they are a good vehicle for reflexivity. 
Rather, they constitute an interesting medium for establishing authorial voice, and define 
the identity of a project. But this does not provide an effective vehicle for reflecting on our 
social biases.  
In sum, if the project of reflexivity is based on a recognition that we are always 
biased and that our knowledge claims are rooted in a subjective experience, one cannot 
seek to address this fact head on. For the strategy of laying bare the subject indulges 
reflexive scholars in a practice that is rife with conflicts of interest. Instead, reflexivity must 
begin with a sober realisation of its own limits and relinquish the terrain of the self. 
Reflexivity is not a matter of good intentions, but of developing a responsible practice to 
address the very moments in our thinking where our own judgement tends to fail.  
 
Second proposition: The traditional dualist framing of reflexive approaches tends to reduce 
reflexivity to an ethical practice rather than provide a proper footing for methodology.  
 
 The second limitation of this agenda concerns the problematic payoff reflexivity 
offers. For the problem is not simply a matter of the ability of scholars to live up to the task 
of objectifying themselves, but a deeper structural ambiguity regarding the pay-off of this 
strategy. Its research program usually rests on doubling up a first order knowledge about 
world politics with a second order knowledge about the author. But having followed a dual 
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path, the problem is always to reconcile both. In what way should reflexive accounts about 
the author qualify our knowledge claims? What is it that can be translated from one order 
of knowledge to the next? Should the 'social location' of a subject become itself a matter of 
debate or a criterion to be used in assessing the validity of knowledge claims? These 
questions are rarely tackled head on by reflexive scholars. And for good reasons! Reflexive 
scholars pursuing a dualist strategy face an impossible task when it comes to reconciling 
dualist claims. Indeed, it is one of my central contentions that any attempt to translate what 
this ‘subjective baggage’ or set of dispositions can mean for the knowledge claim we make 
will always appear arbitrary and highly indeterminate. There is simply too much risk for 
analytical slippage when seeking to determine how reflexive accounts about the subject 
inflect the significance of knowledge claims we make about world politics.  
 The best way to highlight the problem is to start with an example. Let us imagine an 
author who opens up a discussion about neoliberalism by disclosing that she, as civil servant, 
has a stake in opposing the marketization of higher education and this has been a struggle 
she has carried out at a local level against the privatisation of certain services. Now this 
presumably speaks of a personal bias that this person has which will shape how she 
conceives of neoliberalism. But what should we make of this? Certainly this will influence 
how people read her analysis. Yet it will not clarify from where this author speaks in that 
readers will interpret differently what this location means. Depending on where readers 
come from, they will make different assessments of the significance this experience has had 
in shaping the author's conception of neoliberalism. Readers who are sympathetic to this 
battle will tend to look favourably on the piece and may think that this person is well placed 
to speak of neoliberalism because she is experiencing a version of it. Yet others may think 
the opposite and read this as another biased account of neoliberalism which mostly reflects 
the dogmatic and unrealistic opposition of someone who is not willing to recognise the 
broader context of economic constraints she is facing.   
 The basic point here is that all the work carried out to be reflexive will still fail to 
clarify the position from where we speak. For there is a gap between the ethical act of 
disclosing our subject position and the illocutionary effect of this disclosure. The meaning of 
what is being disclosed is not settled by the attempt to clarify from where we speak. Instead, 
this strategy puts into play an overriding signifier that is often more loaded and thus more 
liable to feed the biases of others. This is why this practice often seems counterproductive 
and probably why most reflexive scholars hesitate to employ it. The potential for a dismissal 
or judgement based on subjective grounds are too great.  
 Interestingly, Bourdieu was very keen to avoid shifting the onus onto the subject in 
this way, thus personalising the debate. He was well aware that such disclosures risk taking 
precedence in determining the value of our interventions often relegating the knowledge 
claims we make to a secondary position.35 Bourdieu hoped he could avoid such an outcome 
by improving the quality of reflexive accounts, essentially turning them into scientific 
enquiries in their own right. He wanted to trade autobiography for scientifically established 
facts. In that regard, Fréderique Mérand and Vincent Pouliot describe Bourdieu as a hyper 
positivist36 for the French sociologist had to count on a positivist and empirical ground in 
order to firmly anchor his subject beyond political re-appropriation. But Bourdieu missed 
that what personalises knowledge claims is not simply the quality of the account, but the 
very dualist framing of this form of reflexivity. How do we settle the significance of a 
subject's location for the knowledge claims she makes about world politics? Even if one 
could settle the question of the subject, we would still need to specify how this inflects first 
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order knowledge about world politics. It is the translation which risks turning a reflexive 
account into a criterion for determining the value of a knowledge claim. And if it did not, 
there would be no payoff for reflexivity.  
 This is an inescapable dilemma that the dualist framing of reflexivity cannot 
overcome; a dilemma that came to be reflected in the very ways in which Bourdieu's 
reflexive agenda was re-appropriated in IR. For the challenge in negotiating this translation 
was reflected in two different uses of the framework. Some scholars, usually coming out of 
IR constructivism, used it mostly as a rigorous strategy for objectivating the subject but 
struggled to show what difference this made to their analysis of world politics. Others, 
remained keen to keep the emphasis on the object (international sociologists) and thus 
criticised the former's turn to the subject, but as I argue later (proposition four) they 
struggled to establish in what way their work was reflexive. 
 While Bourdieu believed in making the reflexive component of our analysis public, 
he was unable to specify its significance. That such a translation is fraught with too many 
pitfalls may explain why Bourdieu never did say how knowledge of the subject should be 
evaluated in relation to first-order knowledge claims. And it probably explains why the work 
of reflexivity tends to be relegated to the private sphere, as Leander remarked. But this 
effectively vitiated Bourdieu's ambition to turn reflexivity into a proper intersubjective 
practice for controlling bias, or more specifically a methodology. If it was a genuinely 
productive practice, people would use it more systematically. But the risk of diverting 
attention away from knowledge claims means that reflexive scholars who use this strategy 
have no others choices but to treat reflexivity as an ethic of research that should inform 
scientific engagements rather than as a proper methodology for structuring this 
engagement (i.e. a set of rules of engagement for the production and exchange of 
knowledge). There is nothing wrong with this ethical injunction to know oneself, but this will 
not enable us to clarify the difference reflexivity makes to the analysis of world politics. 
 
 
Third Proposition: The unconscious social and academic biases, which reflexivity is intent 
on uncovering, do not exist in a positive form and thus cannot be simply excavated. 
 
 At this point, I want to take a cue from phenomenology in order to highlight why we 
should not expect much from the strategy of objectifying the objectifying subject. Since 
Hegel’s early elaboration of phenomenology, this approach has always put forward the idea 
that the subject is not something that can be directly objectified, because the subject's 
experience is never reducible to the objectifying terms of language. According to this 
tradition, the subject can be analysed through what it does, but it can never be captured in 
itself. This means notably that it cannot be analysed in abstraction from the object, for what 
characterises it is not simply the entity that it refers to (i.e. a subject), but more importantly 
an existential relationship that is intentional and encompasses both the subject and the 
object. In that sense, the subject of reflexivity is not something we can settle before looking 
at world politics, because there are emergent properties that are always involved in the 
subject-object relationship.  
 By contrast to phenomenology, Bourdieu is intent on indexing the subject. At the 
base of this reflexive project is the belief that there is nothing fundamentally irreducible 
about subjectivity. It is mostly amenable to sociological categories. This means that the 
biases and assumptions that reflexivity is intent on excavating can be identified ‘as 
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sociological content’. In this respect, the subject of which Bourdieu speaks is very much a 
subject of sociology. It is conceived as an entity that has been shaped through socialisation 
and can be understood from the perspective of the various traits, belief and habits it has 
come to internalise. The subject here is thus understood as mostly determined by external 
forces and the work of sociology is to recover these buried layers of determinations which 
shape how subjects act. Applying the tools of sociology onto the reflexive scholar then 
becomes a matter of treating the subject as an object. But it can only do so if the subject is 
analysed in abstraction of subjectivity. For it must take the very thing that distinguishes the 
experience of the subject (subjectivity) out of the equation in order to objectify it. Without 
this excision, I argue, it is impossible to capture the subject as an object amenable to such 
sociological enquiry.  
 The problem here can be best appreciated when looking at two issues highlighted by 
phenomenology which make it impossible to objectify the subject or locate from where it 
speaks. The first concerns the practices we internalise. When we seek to identify what 
determining effects these practices have on the subject, we must conceive of the process of 
internalisation as a discrete phenomenon. In other words, the internalisation of a practice or 
a belief must have inherent effects which can be analysed irrespective of the broader 
configuration of the subject. This is important for otherwise we cannot isolate or identify 
what is produced by the internalisation of a practice. For example, someone who has been 
formed to believe that any social scientific explanation must be based on an econometric 
argument would have distinct biases which would be traceable to econometrics itself and 
the practices associated with it, as if these came with their own inherent set of biases. The 
point is that, in this perspective, dispositions which are internalised must be said to 
determine independently from the broader configuration of subjectivity. Otherwise one 
could not assume that econometrics necessarily impacts in the same way different subjects. 
In the classic sociological conception of the subject, subjectivity is thus reduced to a 
repository of discrete logics which are not themselves re-articulated in the process of being 
internalised.  
 The problem that subjectivity poses in this regards stems from the incredibly dense 
layering which defines its configuration. We are the product of a long series of socialising 
experiences which make all subjects very difficult to objectify. While we may certainly 
accept that people do internalise practices, ways of thinking, discursive structures or 
dispositions, the problem is to assess what difference these internalisations make. If we are 
going to take subjectivity seriously, we cannot treat practices or discourses as discrete 
phenomena which operate more or less in isolation from other internalised practices. In 
that respect, subjectivity cannot be treated as a passive recipient even when subjects are 
not intently seeking to change what they think or how they internalise specific practices. 
Instead it must be taken as the product of a unique synthesis which makes objectifying it 
impossible.   
 The second problem stems from the intentional structure of the subject. It is an 
important contribution of phenomenology to have emphasised that we cannot think of a 
subject without an object. The subject is constituted in its relationships with objects and can 
never be understood in abstraction of them. This basic idea has important consequences 
once more for problematizing the objectification of the subject. Too often, scholars assume 
that social biases operate primarily through internalisation, something that rests exclusively 
on the side of the subject, rather than something that concerns the specific relationship 
between what we have internalised and the objects towards which we deploy these 
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practical templates or dispositions. In the classic sociological perspective, the question of 
the subject is supposed to be addressed before we turn to, and largely in abstraction of, the 
object to which a subject relates to. It is akin to assuming that the biases that stem from 
using econometrics pre-exist the very object that is analysed through econometrics. As if 
econometrics has inherent biases which shape, for example, our view of US trade or 
monetary policy regardless of how a subject deploys econometrics or in which context. In 
other words, this objectification of the subject must deny the practical, creative and agentic 
dimension of subjectivity,37 the way in which subjects are forced to be pragmatic because of 
the distinct features of situations in which they find themselves and where they confront 
given objects.38  
 Bourdieu, of course, was well aware of these issues which were partly responsible 
for his break with structuralism. He was, himself, very influenced by the legacy of 
phenomenology, notably through the work of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. This, in fact, is 
partly what makes his reflexive agenda richer than previous discussions of reflexivity in IR 
where the subject is too often taken to be unproblematically legible. In referring to a logic of 
practice, Bourdieu was keen to highlight the pragmatic and layered nature of subjectivity. 
For these problems meant that we cannot deduce from the existence of social structures 
how people will act. Bourdieu, in fact, went as far as recognising the differential nature of 
the problem, notably with his idea of social fields and his attempt to develop a relational 
approach that builds on a strategic understanding of practice that is not reducible to any 
direct structural determination.39 For it is, he argued, the specific configurations of a social 
field defined by the relationships between subjects and objects in the field which is 
determinant.40  
 However, if phenomenology informed his conception of practice, he never drew out 
its full implication for his own reflexive agenda. For while he recognised that we cannot 
understand the subject simply by deriving its nature from the subject's structural conditions, 
he still believed in the possibility of covering the gap between structure and subjectivity 
through the use of empirical observation. If structures may not provide directly the key to 
the subjects they govern, Bourdieu thought that ethnography and statistics could help us 
see how it ‘really’ works in practice. In short, observations and empirical data would tell us 
what social internalisation had produced in practice; a framing which led him to conceive of 
the notion of the habitus and its structural account of practice. The idea of a logic of practice 
was thus meant to bridge the gap between the objective and the subjective dimensions of 
social life.41 
 This attempt to close the hermeneutic circle by collecting empirical facts and 
observations in order to triangulate the complex relationship of subjects to their 
surroundings essentially rests on a misunderstanding of the challenge that phenomenology 
poses for social sciences. For the problem does not simply stem from a representational bias 
which leads us to neglect the practical dimension of social internalisation. It consists more 
fundamentally in a problem of reverse engineering. If we cannot deduce practice from 
structural determination, why should we be able to reconstruct social conditioning from the 
observation of practice? The point here is that subjectivity filters social conditioning in such 
a way that its role can never be recovered. In others words, subjective multi-layering and 
intentionality pose insurmountable obstacles to the sociological project pursued by 
Bourdieu regardless of the direction we take it, whether it is going from structure to 
behaviour or from behaviour to structure (i.e. to the logic of practice). We are always 
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dealing with a unique subjective formation that is not amenable to a language of structural 
determination even if conceived as a logic of practice.42  
 In his attempt to anchor the subject, Bourdieu was thus forced to revert to a highly 
structural conception of practice which had little to do with phenomenology. This is a key 
tension that runs through his work and which left him in an impossible position. For having 
correctly recognised the differential nature of subjectivity, there was no way for him to 
capture the subject in positive terms. Ironically, Bourdieu's own Self Portrait unwittingly 
makes this point. For despite his claim that we are all the predictable product of our 
environment, Bourdieu sees his own intellectual journey as anything but a process of 
internalisation. What we have instead is a trajectory that is explicitly cast as a process of 
individuation which marks out Bourdieu as he repeatedly puts into question the institutions 
in which he operates: 'Without being truly unconscious, my choices manifested themselves 
above all in refusals and in intellectual antipathies that were most often barely articulated; 
and they expressed themselves explicitly only very belatedly’.43 As captured by this quote, 
Bourdieu's self-portrait often emphasises what distinguishes him rather than what allowed 
him to fit in. Granted, Bourdieu may have been an exceptional scholar, but this process of 
individuation is certainly not an exceptional one. For once more, the point is not that 
Bourdieu failed to apply his own framework to himself, but that the very experience of 
subjectivity is structured in this way. The specific lens that our own history provides us (i.e. 
the process of layering) to make sense of the world in which we are (i.e. the pragmatic 
relationship to the object) is always singular and of great complexity. Few believe that they 
are reducible to the structure in which they are embedded, especially not critical scholars 
who promote reflexivity. This does not mean that we do not internalise practices and 
discourses, but more fundamentally that what is at stake is not defined in these terms. To 
think in terms of internalisation is to depoliticise the subject, to reduce it to its surrounding 
and to lose in the process the very thing that reflexivity was intent on putting up front: the 
politics that are played out in our interventions. After all, politics is a process of settling 
differences.  
 It is interesting to contrast, Bourdieu's strategy with that of another French scholar 
who builds on this phenomenological tradition: Jacques Lacan. Lacan argues that there is a 
fundamental and unbridgeable gap between our experience as subjects and the way in 
which we seek to represent it. He speaks of a split subject, one which is forever divided 
between her experience and her rationalisation of this experience. Experience comes in an 
embodied form tied to perceptions, emotions, and bodily sensations. The words, images 
and ideas we borrow from socialisation to make sense of this experience can never do 
justice to it. A gap thus emerges between, on the one hand, the imagery and the narrative 
we construct about ourselves and, on the other hand, our experience. This productive 
tension, in fact, is the key to the experience of subjectivity and Lacan's notion of the 
unconscious. For the fact that our experience clashes with our own self understanding and 
fails to live up to the ideals we have of ourselves, produces the impression that there is 
something else at work beyond consciousness (i.e. an unconscious). For Lacan, it is in fact 
the failure of the objectification of the subject that is the defining feature of subjectivity. 
 From this perspective, the classic sociological conception of the subject 
overestimates one's ability to decipher subjectivity because it underestimates the role of 
subjectivity in mediating a process of social conditioning. Subjectivity is always grounded in 
a differential terrain. Try as we may, it is always what sticks out that matters and thus 
subjectivity can never be objectified in positive form. While we may rightly assume that our 
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social conditioning is key, it is still the way in which we do not fit our environment which is 
determinant. As Charlotte Epstein notes, we should not address the question of the subject 
by focusing on 'the presumed harmony between the self and its social environment, but on 
the inherent ‘maladaptation’ of a self that can never be fully socialized'.44 In the end, there 
is thus no way to cover a subjective ground largely constituted in differential terms.  
 This constitutive gap between identity, or objectification, and our subjective 
experience not only helps us understand what is irreducible about subjectivity, it indicates 
where are the limits to theorisation, and objectification when it comes to reflexivity. It 
makes clear that defining one’s position in a social field simply cannot capture a ground 
upon which knowledge would be said to be rooted (the location of the subject). This is a 
point, I will later argue, that was most brilliantly captured by Quentin Skinner’s reflexion on 
interpretation and which opens the door for a very different hermeneutic; one much more 
geared towards phenomenological concerns, than the hermeneutic template proposed by 
Bourdieu and his followers.  
 If reflexivity may constitute a nice invitation to reflect on one’s biases, it simply 
cannot make good on its promises to objectify the objectifying subject because subjectivity 
cannot be translated in objectified terms (e.g. as an identity or a habitus). Subjects and 
objects are not the same kind of 'things'. When Bourdieu seeks to treat both in the same 
way, he misses precisely the relational nature of the subject.45 To seek to treat the subject 
as an object is to miss that the epistemological problem that subjectivity poses does not 
pertain to something that has been forgotten, a hidden baggage buried under assumptions 
that the subject would be carrying around with her. Rather, it concerns the way we project 
ourselves to make sense, act upon, or deal with a set of circumstances we have not 
determined. It is not of the order of an internalisation that has been forgotten, but concerns 
action. In that respect, the problem is indeed an issue of perspective, not simply because we 
interpret from somewhere, but more fundamentally because the projection creates its sets 
of blind spots. That is why so many scholars, critical scholars among them, can continue to 
reflexively look hard at themselves, thinking they understand themselves pretty well, yet 
continue to miss the specific nature of their perspective. For their biases are not rooted in 
the position they occupy, but in the relationship between their gaze and the object of their 
gaze.  
 
Fourth Proposition: Reflexive agendas, such as the one proposed by Bourdieu, place the 
onus on ontology rather than address the actual epistemological problem of reification 
which initially motivated the turn to reflexivity.  
 
Tracing out the limitations with the reflexive agenda outlined by Bourdieu raises an 
intriguing question: if reflexive scholars have struggled in practice to substantiate the 
category of the subject, why does this agenda continue to seem so attractive? As I 
suggested above, the key to this puzzle lies in the fact that reflexivity, in its current form, 
does not produce what it claims to produce. It consolidates more than it problematizes the 
ground upon which knowledge claims are made. Yet this strategy could not sustain itself 
simply on the basis of its normative reconstruction of the self. What lends it power and 
substance is not what it has to says about the subject but a subtle shift of emphasis in what 
it takes to be its object.  
Initially, the reflexive approach was devised as a methodology for scholars to relate 
to themselves in order to address an epistemological concern: if we are socially conditioned, 
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how can we problematize what we, ourselves, take for granted. Reflexivity was intended as 
a strategy to deal with a problem that concerns the nature of knowledge, that is the 
difficulty we have to grasp the way in which our knowledge is itself socially and historically 
situated. How can we grasp the very way in which we are socially conditioned? However, 
the approach was often deployed in a very different way. For too often, reflexivity was seen 
as a means to address an ontological concern about the nature of world politics (e.g. the 
nature of capitalist society), rather than an epistemological one about the way we relate to 
it. In other words, reflexivity became a label assigned to approaches that put into question 
what we take for granted about world politics (e.g. capitalism, patriarchy, etc). Once 
qualified in these terms, the challenge became an ontological matter consisting in finding 
the best way to understand world politics. This represented a considerable shift for now 
ontology could be expected to take care of the epistemological problems raised by reflexive 
scholars. By developing the 'best' theory of capitalism, for example, one could challenge 
assumptions about capitalism. The result was that much of the initial epistemological 
concern with problematizing how we make sense, for example of capitalism, was thus lost 
since it was no longer clear what reflexivity was doing in relation to the author.46  
The task of ‘reflecting’ on the subjective foundations of our knowledge is now often 
loosely tackled through some form of hermeneutics aimed at challenging appearances, a 
proposition mostly sustained in the form of an account showing how things we take for 
granted are in fact socially constructed.47  As a result, the onus is placed on historicising the 
object of study rather than problematizing the way this object appears to us. This drift is 
particularly salient among Bourdieu-inspired international sociologists such as Didier Bigo, 
Loic Wacquant, Yves Dezalay and Mikael Rask Madsen who often reject the way in which IR 
constructivists use Bourdieu's reflexive sociology to bend over backward and locate the 
subject. Madsen in particular, has come out strongly against such readings arguing that 
reflexivity is foremost a means for getting the object right.48 For him, it is the construction of 
the object of research that is ultimately at stake. But this only accentuates the common drift 
among reflexive scholars towards ontology when time comes to specify what difference this 
approach can make. For what is by now a banal constructivist concern with historicising the 
object of research is then taken to be the hallmark of reflexivity as a methodology; a quick 
fix which allows once more to place the onus on the 'enlightening' features of Bourdieu's 
ontology.49  
The striking fact about this type of hermeneutic is that it is more and more devoid of 
the phenomenological concerns which had animated modern hermeneutics (Heidegger, 
Gadamer). Instead the emphasis is placed on constantly correcting interpretations by 
adjusting our respective understanding of social processes and their context. But there is 
little consideration for methodological strategies which can problematize how both 
processes and context appear to us; that is means to address the epistemological problem 
of reification in the first place.  
It is a central argument of this article that phenomenological concerns must enter 
the frame in a more explicit way. By phenomenology, I do not mean here the more common 
concern with the everyday life that is often associated with anthropology, but rather a 
Hegelian concern with appearance; the recognition that we are always dealing with 
appearances. The point then is precisely that methodological framing is crucial for us to 
work on the way the world appears in the form of objects. Phenomenology places the onus 
on perspective, a reflexive concern with the way we, as subjects, relate to objects, rather 
than on the ‘fit’ between the object of analysis and its context. It is a matter of techniques 
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we can use to take some distance from our own analysis of world politics and gain a 
reflexive angle on our work, not a strategy to get as close as possible to the reality we seek 
to analyse by developing the right theoretical framework to explain how society really works.    
Bourdieu comes closest to this phenomenological concern when he argues that 
scholars too often analyse social processes from a representational perspective.50 But the 
limitations of his approach are clearly apparent in the 'ontological strategies' he proposes to 
address the problem. For it is once more a matter of contextualising 'in the right way', thus 
leading to discussions about the social field and the habitus. The belief is that connecting 
what agents say (and do) to their specific position in a given social field, will help capture 
this pragmatic and strategic dimension and help challenge this representational bias.51 But 
there are no reflexive hooks here to put our ideas to the test. How do we know whether we 
fall into this trap ourselves? It is one thing to emphasise the need to think in terms of 
practice rather than representation, and not over-intellectualise the rules of the game, but 
another to offer methodological strategies to challenge our own assumptions.52 At best, 
Bourdieu's reflexive sociology offers a set of cross checks to stop researchers from 
projecting their own biases, notably by looking at different types of evidence,53 but there 
are no techniques here to challenge the way in which critical scholars themselves cast 
practices in representational terms. 
This is no mere quibble, for there is something troubling in the fact that despite his 
emphasis on practice, Bourdieu has so often been criticised for his structuralism54 even by 
his own followers.55 Bourdieu’s discussion of neoliberalism in The Social Structures of the 
Economy 56 stands as a powerful testimony to the limits of what could be labelled a reflexive 
voluntarism. In this book, Bourdieu peddles the most common tropes about neoliberalism 
as a general analytical frame for the more detailed analysis of the French housing market 
that Bourdieu conducts. Bourdieu seems to have little qualms about treating categories 
such as neoliberalism or the discipline of economics in the most general way without due 
regards for the strategic practices that define politics within neoliberalism or economics. he 
feels confident enough to shift into a suddenly highly structural and abstract account of 
neoliberalism.57 Neoliberalism is thus presented as a broad movement towards deregulation 
and liberalisation quickly subsumed under the acting interests of the financial world, a 
conception which betrays precisely the certainty of a critique based more on an 
impressionistic sociology than a serious account of practice. Bourdieu also offers sweeping 
conclusions as to the imperialism of economics, a discourse he presents as naturalising a 
narrowly economistic approach based on the idea of the homo economicus.58 The problem 
in this discussion is not that it is necessarily wrong, something which is certainly arguable 
but which would require more space than what I have here. Rather it is the tendency of 
Bourdieu to slip into a structural gaze which seems to invalidate his own central proposition 
about practice. In what sense does this depiction of economics as an almost unified field or 
of neoliberalism as a general structure of governance capture any sense of practice?  
One may assume that Bourdieu simply ventured too far thus undermining the rigour 
he advocated in his more substantial studies. But this would be too easy a response for the 
real problem is not a matter of application, but more importantly of reflexive judgement. 
This can be illustrated by looking towards the more empiricist quarters of Bourdieusian 
scholarship where the sociologist’s framework is loosened up in order to avoid its more 
structural undertones. Here I have in mind more specifically Didier Bigo's work which readily 
admits to some limitations in Bourdieu’s analyses and criticises the more structural 
elements in his thoughts.59 Bigo, however, insists that Bourdieu’s ontology can be relaxed 
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and driven by empirical studies in order to avoid the type of reification I mentioned above. 
Of particular interest here is that Bigo rejects any structural formalism pointing out that the 
habitus is a layered accretions of numerous fields which render it complex and open. The 
idea of a split habitus is based on the recognition that people take part in different social 
fields which produce complex subjectivities that are not reducible to the dispositions 
structured by a single field.60 For this reason, Bigo argues, there can be no simple 
determinism deduced from the doxa of a field.  
While such a reading may certainly provide a more flexible framework, it once more 
speaks to the methodological inadequacy of Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology. For it forces Bigo 
to rely even more on his own judgement when doing empirical work, and assumes that he 
can see what he takes for granted through his own observations. The point about reflexivity 
is precisely to doubt our ability to decipher the 'real nature' of our object of study. It is a 
problematic which emerges from a desire to avoid a form of academic voluntarism, one 
which vests its hope in the power and commitment of critical scholarship to see how things 
really play out. For, as I mentioned, there is always a difficult problem of reverse 
engineering involved. Let us imagine, for example, doing field work within a social field and 
confronting a development or behaviour which challenges our expectations of the game 
being played out. Within a more structural and limited framework, this behaviour can either 
be discarded as exceptional or force us to reflect further and revise our understanding of 
the doxa in this field and the habitus of its actors. But in Bigo's fluid version of the split 
habitus, scholars can adopt a different strategy and presume that the behaviour in question 
can be explained by the input of a different dimension of the habitus, one which pertains to 
dispositions developed in another social field. In that respect, the very flexibility called for 
undermines the reflexive dimension of the framework for it allows scholars to protect their 
assumptions about the game they study and simply attribute non conforming observations 
to another field. Not only does the methodology not provide any guide in order to decide 
whether a behaviour indicates a problem with our understanding of the field, or simply a 
peculiarity which comes from the outside, but it also provides an easy way out to simply 
discard unwelcome evidence. While this certainly allows Bigo to avoid theoretical problems 
that dog Bourdieu, it does so by conveniently shifting the burden to the empirical level. 
Loosening methodology in this way may provide more space and flexibility to accommodate 
a complex ‘social reality’, but this also means that the engagement is not as useful for 
challenging our own assumptions. It serves a weaker reflexive purpose.  
My point is that a reflexive distance is not something we gain from intention or 
commitment to studying how history or empirical reality really plays out. It is a conceptual 
space that has to be constituted through methodological means. To give a concrete example 
of a hermeneutic approach which incorporates explicitly a phenomenological concern with 
problematizing appearances, one can think of Quentin Skinner’s brilliant discussion of 
political theory and its context. Skinner’s approach stems from a basic reflexive problem we 
confront when seeking to interpret a text from a different political context from ours. As he 
argues, it is often the distance between the context in which this text was written and our 
own which tends to stand out at first. We thus often focus on the vocabulary or ideas that 
are distinctive of the age and which differ from what we know, rather than the politics of a 
text which are found in the way in which these are mobilised by an author to specific ends. 
Take for example the labour theory of value that so many scholars attribute to Marx as a 
defining feature of his contribution. This notion is clearly an artefact of his age. It was not 
invented by Marx, but borrowed from liberal theory, more specifically from David Ricardo. It 
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was a prominent theoretical tool people used at the time to articulate ideas. It would thus 
be mistaken to believe that Marx's ideas are defined by his emphasis on labour as the 
source of value because this was also characteristic of liberal economics at the time.61 What 
distinguishes Marx's contribution is what he did with these liberal concepts, his distinctive 
use of the labour theory of value or more specifically the way in which he used the 
conventions of his age. But this can only be revealed through a specific work of 
contextualisation.62 
In making this point, Skinner puts forward what is a largely counterintuitive but 
highly effective method of contextualisation. The purpose he assigns to contextualisation is 
not to assess the meaning of the text but to assess authorship.63 Contextualisation serves to 
contrast an author's work with the conventions of his time. In that sense, contextualisation 
specifies what the text does. It is foremost a procedure for problematizing immediate 
appearances rather than explaining the text in itself. By contrast to a basic hermeneutic, 
which focuses on the fit with the context, Skinner challenges our assumptions about what is 
significant in a text. By contrasting text and context, he places the former in perspective and 
destabilises how the object appears to us and what we think needs to be explained. This is a 
direct attempt to problematize perspective, one that is much more effective than seeking to 
identify our own social biases and commitments before examining the actual object of 
research.  
 
Fifth Proposition: The pretention to be able to locate from where one speaks, or to objectify 
the objectifying subject, sets up asymmetric forms of communication which are fraught with 
ethical problems.  
 
 This final point brings us back to the more general problem of what is at stake in the 
debate about reflexivity. As I pointed out, the big challenge is to turn this project into 
something that is more than a simple ethical call to awareness of the self. This has proved 
difficult, I have argued, because of the limitations of an agenda focusing on determining 
from where one speaks. For this reason, the reflexive agenda has had a greater critical 
impact in challenging other approaches than a productive one in defining a new 
methodology. But such an imbalance has often meant that reflexive scholars apply different 
standards on those they criticise, than what they subject themselves to, since they never 
clarify what expectations they set for themselves. In this way, reflexivity has often served a 
rhetorical purpose in claiming a distinct quality to the knowledge reflexive scholars produce, 
on the basis of their awareness of the limits to objectivity. What was initially a project based 
on recognising one’s own limitations was thus turned into a claim to enlightenment;64 one 
which mostly dresses up the knowledge claims we make instead of changing how these 
claims are produced in the first place.  
 Bourdieu perhaps more than any other was known to deploy such rhetorical motifs 
to justify, often explicitly, the objectivity of his own viewpoint. It is telling that he likened his 
work, or more generally the work of sociology, to that of a psychoanalyst, in that he was 
unearthing secrets that society was not willing to recognise. Such a framing helped entertain 
an asymmetrical form of communication which once more indulged Bourdieu in his self-
belief of being on the right side. For it simply became too tempting for him to interpret 
critiques of his work as further proofs that he had grasped sensitive truths about society:  
Sociology, which of all sciences is the best placed to know the limits of the 'intrinsic 
force of the true idea', knows that the force of the resistance which will be opposed 
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to it will be very exactly commensurate with the 'problems of the will' which it has 
managed to overcome.65 
 
There was much here that was reminiscent of the traditional image of psychoanalysis that 
Lacan had so powerfully criticised in the 1950s.66 According to the latter, psychoanalysts had 
too often exploited the presumption to know patients better than patients know 
themselves as a way to establish relationships of power. The problem Lacan identified 
pertained to the communication that is then established. For when the analyst begins to buy 
into this very idea, there is no more space for reflexively putting into question her own 
interpretation. Indeed, the debate is skewed for anything the patient may believe 
challenges the analyst's view, can be dismissed on account of the inability of the patient to 
come to terms with her own repressed history. In many cases, the denial, in fact, is then 
taken as the very proof that the analyst is right; a sign of the other's alienation.   
 The problem here of course is not so much the fact that Bourdieu responds to 
criticisms, but rather the closure that was effectuated by his belief that his knowledge was 
of a different order and thus subject to different epistemological criteria. By using reflexivity 
to move at a meta level, Bourdieu could always claim 'reflexive immunity' on the grounds of 
his ability to see things that others could not. It was a ploy which closed the space for 
debate by dismissing, as he frequently did, his critiques for missing the distinctive nature of 
the knowledge he was producing. Such claims, unsurprisingly, contributed in making 
Bourdieu the target of vicious attacks from aggrieved scholars who saw Bourdieu's 
reflexivity as a power play to arbitrarily discount other voices.67  
 Ultimately, reflexivity as an approach has little to offer if it remains trapped in the 
belief that reflexivity is a state that can be achieved through introspection. As Lynch pointed 
out, the illusion that reflexive scholars have a monopoly over reflexivity, as if reflexivity was 
a quality only possessed by some scholars or some approaches, is highly problematic.68 It 
entertains the illusion that reflexive scholars have a knowledge of a different order, and 
skews the terrain for debate because what reflexivity refers to (the subject) is invoked 
without being properly displayed. To avoid this, reflexivity must remain a first order 
knowledge about world politics even when it is working on the self. It cannot be defined in 
terms of a condition we wish to reach (i.e. the illusory meta position of becoming reflexive). 
Rather the challenge is to clarify how the recognition of our subjective starting point can 
change the way in which we analyses world politics. 
  
Conclusion 
 
The problem of methodology has traditionally revolved around a concern with 
controlling subjective biases in the production of knowledge. Bourdieu saw this control of 
subjective biases as an integral component of what defines (social) science as an 
intersubjective practice with its rules governing the interactions between scholars.69 But 
objectivity, he argued, is a product of these rules, an intersubjective quality conferred upon 
knowledge because of the rules, rather than a pre-existing universal quality that grounds 
these rules in the first place. For this reason, he saw no need to choose between the 
aspiration to objectivity and the recognition of the social nature of knowledge production. 
Instead, reflexivity became Bourdieu's plank to bring these two together as a means to 
clarify what is at stake in the production of knowledge. The twist was that objectivating the 
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subject of knowledge production would now be seen as an integral component of the 
process by which we control for biases.  
But Bourdieu, as many other constructivists, struggled to respond to the 
contradictory pull that comes from recognising the need for rules but refusing to endorse 
the form they have at a particular point in time because of the discipline they imply. For 
Bourdieu, the challenge was to keep a healthy distance without wanting to abolish them. As 
a result, reflexive sociology was conceived as a 'middle of the road' methodology based on 
reasonable accommodations of these conflicting demands. His reflexive sociology offered 
interesting insights into the dilemmas and challenges that await critical scholars in seeking 
to break from common sense.70 It identified various biases that hinder this task and pointed 
out that, in fact, methodology was often the source itself of these biases, rather than a 
means to control them. But this left him with little more than an invitation to avoid these 
traps. There was no well-defined methodological alternative to be found here. Instead, 
reflexive sociology was mostly conceived as a set of cross checks that one would carry out in 
order to avoid excesses. In short, Bourdieu hoped that becoming aware of the problems of 
others, and of our own biases, would help us avoid a similar fate. In that respect, he saw 
reflexivity as a means to control bias, but this was mostly an indirect and voluntarist 
strategy that vested its hope in the craft of the sociologist rather than in a proper 
methodology.  
My main argument is that reflexivity can indeed offer a methodology to control for 
bias, although not dispense with them, if it conceives of these biases in phenomenological 
terms. As I pointed out, the traditional focus of reflexivity on personal biases can only lead 
us towards an ethical strategy, one which is of course highly laudable in its own right, but in 
no way robust enough to offer a methodological platform. What phenomenology does is to 
turn a concern with particularism (related to a specific subject) into a more general concern 
with the nature of subjectivity and the problem it poses for knowledge creation. It casts the 
problem as one concerning subjectivity (in general) rather than the subject per se (in its 
specificity); one that pertains to the form of subjectivity, rather than its content. From this 
perspective, the control of bias should not be tailored to one's specific circumstances or 
supposed location. If reflexivity is to offer an alternative methodology, it must think of 
biases in a more generic sense as emanating from the experience of subjectivity. 
Phenomenology is thus based on the recognition that if others have fallen into the traps of 
reification, chances are we will also. For this reason, we must avoid indulging in the false 
sense of confidence that 'reflexive'' awareness may provide. Being reflexive here is to accept 
that alienation is a condition that applies to us all, not just to those who are supposedly un-
reflexive.71 Control for bias then takes an inverted form. Instead of assuming that we can 
cast out these biases or make them explicit, we must start by assuming these 
epistemological biases and develop corrective lenses to compensate for them. 
I have used the example of Skinner's strategy of contextualisation to illustrate what I 
mean by corrective lens. Skinner starts from a basic problem of ahistoricism that is 
frequently noted in the literature. The point here is not to be aware so that we can take 
seriously the specificity of the context, for we know that there are plenty of scholars aware 
of the problem who continue to reproduce it. For this reason, Skinner is not trying per se to 
look closer at reality to see how it really happens. Instead he proposes to refract the 
significance of a work in political theory through a contextualisation which is intended to 
mark out what is distinctive about this work from its broader literary context. From an 
ontological perspective, there is no denying that a political work 'belongs to its age'. But 
20 
 
thinking along those ways has traditionally fuelled an ahistorical bias because of the very 
nature of interpretation. So Skinner chooses instead to use contextualisation as a way to 
make the work stand out so that authorship may be assessed more concretely.72  
 In my own work, I have used the notion of agency as a similar corrective lens 
intended to refract our perspective on the processes of social construction. Starting from 
another seemingly common concern in IR with grasping the socially constructed nature of 
world politics, I argue that it is misleading to believe that awareness of the importance of 
agency can address the problem. Try as hard as we may, we always struggle to establish 
whether and how people make a difference to the broad social processes we are usually 
concerned with. The issue here is partly one of scale and its effect on perspective. Agency is 
easy to perceive on a very localised basis. The challenge is to build the conceptual bridges 
which allow us to connect these localised developments to the broad macro processes we 
usually study. For this reason, a commitment to factor in agency will be insufficient on its 
own as reflected in the fact that constructivists so rarely made good on their promise to do 
so.73 It can only be tackled by changing our perspective, notably through a comparative 
framing which is devised, not simply to look at agency, but to make it stand out.74   
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